| Teresa Violet Arasheben |
| Teresa Violet Arasheben is a wonderful individual |
| 21st of Mar, 2012 by plinkoo |
I, as a business person and private individual, have had the pleasure of knowing and dealing with Teresa Violet Arasheben for the past seven years and I find her to be an extremely honest, forthright, stand-up person and an excellent contributor to society.
Teresa Violet Arasheben conducts herself just as she runs her business, which is always with utmost respect, dignity, strength, honesty, and professionalism.
Teresa Violet Arasheben has been and is an example to aspire to.
Every decent person who has known and knows Ms. Arasheben is proud to know her and to associate with her at all times. |
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THAT'S A NICE FABRICATED, DELUSIONAL STORY ABOVE, NO DOUBT, WRITTEN BY TERESA VIOLET ARASHEBEN, HERSELF!! (AKA TERESA VILET ARASHEBEN, VIOLET ARASHEBEN, TESSA ARASHEBEN, AND COUNTLESS OTHER NAMES WHICH NO ONE CAN KEEP TRACK OF. THERE IS ALSO ANOTHER LIE HERE, REGARDING THE DATES OF WHEN HER PRISON RECORDS ENDED. IF YOU READ THE FULL TRANSCRIPT BELOW, YOU WILL SEE THAT SHE DID A YEAR OF JAIL TIME FROM MAY 3, 2006 TO MAY 7, 2007. SHE'S BEEN TO JAIL SO MANY TIMES SHE CAN'T EVEN KEEP TRACK, SO SHE DEPENDS ON LIES TO HOLD HERSELF UP. WE WILL ALSO MENTION THAT WHEN SHE CAME TO WORK FOR MAXIMUM HEALTH, SHE HAD ALSO JUST GOTTEN DONE WITH MORE JAIL TIME AND PROBATION. SHE DIDN'T START THERE UNTIL 2011. SHE WASN'T SUPPOSED TO BE ANYWHERE NEAR CREDIT CARDS. .. AND OF COURSE, THE MINUTE HER PROBATION ENDED, SHE WAS STEALING CREDIT CARDS AGAIN FROM TRUSTING CUSTOMERS AND VICTIMIZING EVEN MORE PEOPLE.
hERE'S THE REAL STORY: THIS MONSTER HAS VICTIMIZED COUNTLESS PEOPLE AS YOU WILL READ BELOW IN ONE OF HER MANY TRANSCRIPTS FROM ONE OF HER MULTITUDES OF COURT CASES. SHE'S ALSO BEEN IMPRISONED FOR 2 YEARS IN STATE PRISON FOR MURDER FOR HIRE AND COUNTLESS OTHER ASSAULTS ON COUNTLESS PEOPLE. (ALL OF WHICH INCLUDE, BURGLARY, GRAND THEFT, FORGERY BY USE OF CREDIT CARDS, VANDALISM, PROSTITUTION, DRUG TRAFFICKING, . ASSAULT, ...ETC... THE LIST GOES ON AND ON. EVERYWHERE SHE GOES, THERE IS ANOTHER VICTIM IN HER PATH!! SHE ALSO DID 2 YEARS IN A PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT FACILITY AND IT OBVIOUSLY DID ABSOLUTELY NO GOOD. SHE CONTINUES TO COMMIT CRIMES EVERYWHERE SHE GOES. SHE IS COMPLETELY INCAPABLE OF TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MESS SHE'S MADE OF HER LIFE AND CONTINUES TO BLAME OTHERS FOR THE BACKLASH SHE RECEIVES FROM HER CONTINUOUS NEED TO DO HARM TO OTHERS. SHE HAS ABSOLUTELY NO SELF CONTROL. AT THE TIME SHE WROTE THE STATEMENT ABOVE, SHE HAD JUST GOTTEN OUT OF PRISON (YET AGAIN)... AND HERE AGAIN, YOU WILL SEE THE HEAVILY LADEN DOCUMENT OF CRIMES SHE HAS COMMITTED, NOTHING EVER CHANGES WITH THIS NIGHTMARE OF AN INDIVIDUAL!! MAKE SURE YOU READ ALL OF THIS.
IF HER IDEA OF MAKING A SUCCESS OF HER LIFE IS THIS, THAT IS EXTREMELY SAD. SHE'S A VERY UNFORTUNATE INDIVIDUAL WHO ACTUALLY THINKS FOR A MINUTE THAT IF SHE GETS ON THE INTERNET AND WRITES TERRIBLE THINGS ABOUT OTHERS, WHILE SHE WRITES POSITIVE THINGS ABOUT HERSELF, IT'S GOING TO CHANGE WHO SHE IS. TERESA, THE REAL STORY IS GOING TO FOLLOW YOU AROUND FOR THE REST OF YOUR LIFE, AS LONG AS YOU ARE OUT TO HURT OTHERS AND TAKE WHAT'S NOT YOURS!! GET SOME REAL HELP!!... SHE ALSO HAS AN OBSESSION ABOUT CHILD MOLESTATION AND HAS WRITTEN SCATHING LIES ON COUNTLESS WEBSITES TO GET REVENGE ON ALL THE PEOPLE WHO HAD A PART IN HER SPENDING THE LAST 6 MONTHS IN JAIL. SHE HAS WRITTEN ABOUT EVERYONE IN THE COMPANY "MAXIMUM HEALTH" WHICH IS THE PLACE SHE VICTIMIZED COUNTLESS PEOPLE, INCLUDING CO-WORKERS AND CUSTOMERS. WHEN SHE WAS BUSTED AND SENT TO PRISON, (AGAIN)!! STAY AWAY FROM THIS CRAZY DELUSIONAL PSYCHOPATH!! WE CAN'T WARN YOU ENOUGH!!!
P. v. Arasheben
P. v. Arasheben
Filed 9/23/08 P. v. Arasheben CA2/8
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
TERESA VILET ARASHEBEN,
Defendant and Appellant.
B199554
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA053271)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Elden S. Fox and Lisa B. Lench, Judges. Affirmed as modified with directions.
William J. Capriola, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Peggy Z. Huang, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
After Teresa Vilet Arasheben violated the terms and conditions of her probation, the trial court revoked probation and imposed a previously suspended sentence of seven years and four months. Arasheben contends on appeal that: (1) the trial court did not secure a knowing, express, or intelligent waiver of her right to accrued custody credits; (2) the trial court incorrectly calculated the custody credits she did receive, denying her two days of conduct credit; and (3) under Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 (Cunningham), the trial courts imposition of an upper term sentence violated her Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. We affirm the judgment, with directions on remand as to Arashebens custody credits.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Teresa Arasheben was charged with four counts of second degree commercial burglary (Pen. Code, 459; counts 1, 4, 7, and 10);[1]one count of forgery by use of a credit card ( 484f, subd. (b); count 2); two counts of petty theft with a prior ( 666; counts 3 and 12); one count of grand theft of personal property ( 487, subd. (a); count 5); three counts of theft of an access card ( 484e, subd. (d); counts 6, 9 and 11); and one count of attempted grand theft of personal property ( 664/487, subd. (a); count 8). It was further alleged appellant served five prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b), and that she suffered one prior strike conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes Law ( 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d) & 667, subds. (b)-(i)).
The charges stemmed from two occasions where Arasheben went into spas for facials, was left alone in the treatment room, and stole the credit cards from the wallets of the women working in the salon. Arasheben later used the credit cards to purchase gift certificates.
On January 6, 2005, Arasheben pleaded no contest to four counts of second degree burglary ( 459, counts 1, 4, 7, & 10); one count of forgery by the unlawful use of a credit card ( 484(f), subd. (b); count 2); and one count of petty theft with a prior ( 664/484, subd. (a), 666)). Arasheben also admitted one prior conviction for which she was sentenced to state prison ( 667.5). In exchange, the trial court stated Arasheben would be placed on probation for five years, and that it would impose and suspend execution of a seven year four month prison sentence. Arasheben was to be released to a residential treatment center on condition that she remain at that program for a period of not less than one year for purposes of counseling and addressing certain psychiatric issues in regard to [her] recidivism. The court further advised that it would grant a Romero motion as to a prior serious felony to permit Arasheben to receive probation and regular time credits. The People agreed to dismiss the counts for which the court could not impose any additional time under the law given the constraints of section 654.[2]
The trial court did, in fact, impose and suspend execution of an aggregate term of seven years and four months in the state prison, comprised of: the high term of three years on count 1, based on the prior history in this matter and also the fact the defendant was on parole at the time of the current offense. . . ; one-third of the mid-term of eight months for each of counts 2, 4, 7, 10 and 12; and a one-year enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b). Arasheben was placed on five years formal probation, during which time she was to participate in a 12-month residential program that would include psychiatric and psychological counseling. Arasheben was not to leave the program without court or probation department permission.
On February 15, 2005, Arasheben left the residential program without permission, thereby violating her probation. Probation was summarily revoked on February 17, 2005. On April 25, 2005, the trial court held a probation violation hearing. At the hearing, Arasheben pleaded with the court for a chance to continue in the residential treatment program. After hearing from Arasheben and her counsel, the trial court, Arashebens counsel, and Arasheben had the following exchange:
The Court: Im not going to release her today. If she wants to waive her back time credits, I will reset this for July the 7th, which is the date she was supposed to come back here, and then I will agree to release her to [the residential treatment facility], but Im not going to release her before that. []
Ms. Leeds [Arashebens counsel]: Thank you very much, your Honor.
The Court: Okay. Does she want to come back here on July 7th and waive her back time credits in this matter?
Ms. Leeds: Yes. Thank you, your Honor.
The Court: Ms. Arasheben, I want you to listen to me. I get any reports from the county jail that there are problems there, and Im going to advance the matter, bring you back here, and I may change my mind. [] If you comply with your regimen and you behave yourself, on July 7th Im going to release you back to [the treatment center] to complete a 12-month program. [] And you may feel that by doing that Im delaying somewhat your rehabilitation. But I will tell you, youre this close to going off to the Department of Corrections again. Do you understand that? [] I dont want any complaints. I dont want any crying. I dont want any pleading or begging. You agree to come back here on July 7th to go back to [the treatment center]?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
Arasheben then inquired whether she could ask the court a question, and proceeded to request specific medical orders for herself.
On July 7, 2005, Arasheben returned to court with counsel for further proceedings. After confirming that the treatment center was willing to re-admit Arasheben, the court asked Arashebens counsel: Have you talked to your client . . . and shes amenable to going back to [the treatment center] and following through with the program as previously ordered by the court in lieu of going to state prison for six years? Arashebens counsel answered yes. The court then asked if Arasheben was going to admit the probation violation, and Arasheben answered yes. The court reinstated probation and stated on the record:
Pursuant to 4019 of the Penal Code and 2900.5 of the Penal Code, Ms. Arasheben does waive her previous time credits both actual and good time/work time. She is ordered to serve 158 days in the county jail. She will get credit for 106 actual days plus 52 good time/work time for a total of 158 days. Neither Arasheben nor her counsel made any objection to the courts statement that Arasheben was waiving her previous time credits.
In May 2006, Arashebens probation was again summarily revoked after she was arrested for petty theft. On February 23, 2007, following a probation hearing, the trial court found that Arasheben had violated the terms and conditions of her probation. On May 7, 2007, the trial court executed the previously suspended sentence of seven years and four months. The court awarded 1, 020 days of credit against the sentence. The same day, Arasheben filed a pro per motion to recall the sentence, arguing that the court had not awarded her credit for previous time in custody and [a]t absolutely no time did [she] waive any time credits. Perhaps in July 2005 Judge Fox ordered time in program to start over. But no time credits were waived. On May 25, 2007, the court denied the motion. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Arashebens Johnson Waiver was Valid
Arasheben contends that she did not waive her past custody or conduct credits. We reject this argument.
A defendant is entitled to credit against a term of imprisonment for days spent in custody before sentencing, as well as days spent in custody after sentencing as a condition of probation. (Pen. Code, 2900.5; People v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1050, 1053 (Johnson).) However, a defendant may also expressly waive such credits against an ultimate prison sentence (commonly known as a Johnson waiver), and trial courts have the authority to condition probation upon a waiver of credits for time in custody. (Johnson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1055.) A defendants waiver of custody credits must be knowing and intelligent, which means that the defendant must understand she is giving up custody credits to which she would otherwise be entitled. (Ibid; People v. Arnold (2004) 33 Cal.4th 294, 308 (Arnold); People v. Hilger (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1528, 1532.)
The record reflects that at the April 25, 2005 probation violation hearing, Arashebens counsel expressly advised the court that Arasheben agreed to waive her past custody credits as a condition of the courts agreement to reinstate probation. Accordingly, at the next hearing on July 7, 2005, the court entered an order indicating that Arasheben waived her previous credits. However, Arasheben argues that a Johnson waiver must be personal and express, and, because the trial court neither engaged in a specific dialogue with her directly about waiving the past credits, nor secured her direct statement waiving her custody credits, there was no valid waiver.
Arasheben offers no legal authority for her argument that her counsels statements were not an effective waiver and case law provides otherwise. Counsel may waive all but a few fundamental rights for a defendant. [Citation.]. . . . Included in that narrow exception are such fundamental matters as whether to plead guilty, whether to waive the constitutional right to trial by jury, whether to waive the right to counsel, and whether to waive the privilege against self-incrimination. [Citation.] As to these rights, the criminal defendant must be admonished and the court must secure an express waiver; as to other fundamental rights of a less personal nature, courts may assume that counsels waiver reflects the defendants consent in the absence of an express conflict. [Citation.] (People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 873-874.) Arasheben offers no argument to support her apparent assumption that the entitlement to time creditsa statutory rather than constitutional rightis a fundamental matter that cannot be waived through counsel when the defendant is present in the courtroom and understands the proceedings.
Moreover, there is no evidence that Arashebens counsel was acting alone, or against Arashebens wishes. When determining whether a Johnson waiver was knowing and intelligent we look to the totality of [the] circumstances. (People v. Salazar (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1554, fn. 1 (Salazar).) Here, the record as a whole indicates that Arasheben voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived her past custody credits in exchange for the reinstatement of probation. At the April 25, 2005, hearing, Arasheben and her counsel pleaded with the court for compassion and leniency so that the court might reinstate probation rather than imposing Arashebens suspended sentence. Arasheben was present when the trial court indicated that it would reinstate probation if Arasheben was willing to waive past credits. The trial court raised this issue twice, and when the court asked Arashebens counsel directly if Arasheben would waive her past credits, her counsel answered yes. Arasheben said nothing, even though she had freely spoken during the proceedings, and indeed interrupted later to ask the court a question directly. (Salazar, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1554-1556 [court found defendants Johnson waiver knowing and intelligent where, on more than one occasion, neither defendant nor counsel objected to courts description of the scope of the Johnson waiver].)
Over two months passed, and at the next hearing, when the trial court asked counsel if Arasheben was willing to proceed with the plan set forth by the court at the previous hearing, counsel answered yes, and Arasheben said nothing. The trial court stated on the record that Arasheben was waiving her past credits, and neither Arasheben nor her counsel objected to question or correct the courts statement. Throughout the proceedings at issue in this case, Arasheben felt free to speak directly to the court to ask questions and challenge her counsel. That she did not do so in any of the instances in which the court discussed her waiver of credits indicates she understood and agreed with the waiver her counsel had communicated.
Although the better practice is for sentencing courts to expressly admonish defendants who waive custody creditsunder Johnson about the scope and effect of such a waiver, the failure to include such an explicit advisement will not, however, invalidate a Johnson waiver by which the defendant is otherwise found to have knowingly and intelligently relinquished his or her right to custody credits under section 2900.5. (Arnold, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 309.) Under the totality of the circumstances we conclude that Arashebens Johnson waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.[3]
II. Imposition of the High Term Did Not Violate Arashebens
Constitutional Rights
In 2005, the trial court imposed and stayed a sentence of seven years four months, which included a three-year upper term on one count of second degree burglary. The court imposed the upper term based on the prior history in the matter and because Arasheben was on parole at the time of the current offense. Arasheben contends that under Cunningham, the trial court relied on improper factors to impose the upper term and thereby violated her Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a jury determination by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
While we agree with the Attorney General that appellate review of this issue is impermissible because Arasheben failed to secure a certificate of probable cause (see People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 79), we note also that under People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63 (Towne), and People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799 (Black II), we must reject Arashebens arguments. In Black II, our Supreme Court held that if a single aggravating factor has been established by the jurys verdict, the defendants admissions, or the fact of a prior conviction, the trial courts imposition of the upper term does not violate a defendants right to a jury trial, even if the trial court considered other aggravating circumstances in deciding to impose the upper term. (Black II, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 813.) In Towne, our Supreme Court expressly held that the federal constitutional right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt on aggravating circumstances does not extend to the circumstance that a defendant was on probation or parole at the time of the offense or has served a prior prison term. (Towne, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 79.)
Here, the trial courts decision to impose the high term on count 1 was based in part on the aggravating factor that Arasheben was on parole when she committed the offense in question, and in part on her prior criminal history.These facts were supported by the record and are not impermissible judicial fact finding. (Black II, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 818-820; People v. Yim (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 366, 370-371; People v. Thomas (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 212, 220-223.) As a result, the trial court did not violate Arashebens constitutional rights by imposing the upper term on count 1.[4]
III. Arasheben is Entitled to One Additional Day of Conduct Credit
Arasheben contends that the trial court erred in calculating the conduct credits she had not waived, and was ultimately awarded. The Attorney General agrees that the trial court erred in its calculations, but the parties modified calculations differ by one day. We conclude that the trial court did err, and Arasheben should have received one additional day of conduct credit.
Under Section 4019, a defendant receives two days of good conduct or work credit (conduct credit) for each four-day block of time served. (In re Marquez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 14, 25.) The trial court should combine all days of actual custody before calculating conduct credits. (People v. Culp (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1284.) Then, [t]he proper method of calculating presentence custody credits is to divide by four the number of actual presentence days in custody, discounting any remainder. That whole-number quotient is then multiplied by two to arrive at the number of good/work credits. Those credits are then added to the number of actual presentence days spent in custody, to arrive at the total number of presentence custody credits. (Id. at p. 1283.)
Here, the trial court found:
Arasheben served the following actual days in jail, for which she is entitled to conduct credit:
o between March 24, 2005 and July 7, 2005 (106 days);
o between December 20, 2005 and January 6, 2006 (17 days, not including December 20, which the court included as a day served in the residential facility); and
o between May 3, 2006 and May 7, 2007 (370 days);[5]
This totaled 493 days of custody credits. However, the trial court calculated Arashebens conduct credits based on each separate block of dates, rather than the aggregate number of days in custody. When calculated together, Arasheben should have received a total of 246 conduct credits. (106+17+370 = 493; divided by 4 = 123.25; discounting the remainder = 123; multiplied by 2 = 246.)
The trial court also found that Arasheben served actual days in the residential treatment facility, for which she is not entitled to conduct credit (See People v. Moore (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 783.):
o between July 7, 2005 and December 20, 2005 (167 days); and
o between January 7, 2006 and May 3, 2006 (117 days).
However, the Attorney General correctly points out that two of these dates overlap with days Arasheben spent in jail, and the court gave Arasheben custody credits for jail time for July 7, 2005 and May 3, 2006. Thus, combining the dates from July 8 through December 20, 2005 (166 days) and January 7 through May 2, 2006 (116 days), Arasheben was entitled to an additional 282 days of custody credit, for a total of 1, 021 actual plus custody credits (493+246+282).[6]
IV. Correction of Abstract Judgment
As the Attorney General points out, count 2 of the August 18, 2004 information charged Arasheben with a violation of section 484f, subdivision (b) forgery by the unlawful use of a credit card and this is the charge to which Arasheben pled no contest. However, subsequent minute orders and the abstract of judgment erroneously identify count 2 as section 484e, subdivision (d) possession of access card information with the intent to use it fraudulently. The abstract of judgment should be corrected to reflect that count 2 was a charge under section 484f, subdivision (b).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to reflect a total of 1, 021 days of presentence credit. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. The court shall amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the modified presentence credit, and to conform to defendants plea under count 2, which was a charge under section 484f, subdivision (b), and shall forward copies to the Department of Corrections.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BIGELOW, J.
We concur:
RUBIN, Acting P. J.
FLIER, J.
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[1] All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
[2] Section 654 prohibits multiple punishment for the same act or omission.
[3] Though Arasheben does not cite to or rely upon People v. Harris (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1223 (Harris), we note that it is a similar though distinguishable case. In Harris, a case decided before Salazar and Arnold, the trial court accepted the defendants argument that he did not intelligently or knowingly waive past credits. The trial court there, however, raised the waiver of credits for the first time at sentencing and the defendant was not advised on the record of the consequence of waiver or the number of days involved. (Id. at p. 1227.) As explained above, the waiver of credits was raised here several times before the trial court entered Arashebens waiver on the record. The totality of the circumstances indicates that her waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, even though it was communicated on the record through counsel alone.
[4] While Arasheben further argues that Black II is wrongly decided and permits an unconstitutional sentence, she concedes that this court is bound by California Supreme Court decisions.
[5] The trial court mistakenly calculated this period as 369 days, rather than 370, apparently omitting the last day.
[6] Arasheben was not entitled to conduct credits based on time served in the residential treatment facility. (People v. Palazuelos (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 962, 964-965.) |
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