| Patrick B. Hannon, Long Island, New York |
| Stalking, vulgar romantic solicitation, solicitation for prostitution, adultery, sexual harassment |
| 4th of Sep, 2011 by nycwoman |
Sent via email August 31, 2011
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Cease and Desist Stay Away Notice
August 31, 2011
To: Patrick B. Hannon
From: Irina Borisenko
Please be informed as of this date to stay away from all my present and past employers including business addresses, work sites, employees, contractors, consultants, clients. Do not contact me by yourself, or assign or pay any person whatsoever, to contact me or any of my family, my husband, children, friends, or relatives. Stay away from me and all of these people, their family and friends. Do not contact me, or have anyone else contact me, or the above mentioned people by phone calls to personal or business lines, fax communication, do not contact me by using printed media, electronic devices, fax, or internet postings under anonymous names- or by your name, do not contact me by mail, any media postings, including internet posting communications harassing me and my family, posting copyrighted photographs of myself or any family member or friend, do not contact me by instant message, telegram, telephone, fax, or in person. Any photographs you are in possession of that belongs to me are copyrighted and continued use we will pursue you for violation of US Copyright laws. Do not contact me or any of my family, my husband, children, friends, or relatives- STAY AWAY. I have no business with you and demand that you stay away from all family, friends, and work associates.
Your recent email received on August 31, 2011 in which you sent to me today is in violation of my request in April, 2011 to stay away and not contact me in any manner whatsoever. We will pursue for legal remedy if you do not cease and desist immediately. You mention in your email that you "Love" me along with other sexual comments. Would your wife like to know that me and many other women were your mistresses and that you paid for our sex services like cheap prostitutes? You even took me to your son's house with little grandchilden in the house just to have sex with me. You use to pay me for sex when you came for a facial. You raped me and paid me money when you were married to your wife and committed adultery. I will be happy to testify for her in court. Does your wife know you have sexually transmitted diseases (STD's)? I've asked you before to leave me alone but you still continue to harass and stalk me. My husband will persue every legal remedy to make sure that you stop your harrassment, stalking, and future rape attempts of me.
[New York: Note that your behavior is a violation of New York State Penal Law Section 240.25 - Harassment in the First Degree, Section 240.26 - Harassment in the Second Degree, Section 240.30 - Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree, Section 240.45 - Criminal Nuisance in the Second Degree, Section 120.45 - Stalking in the Fourth Degree, Section 120.50 - Stalking in the Third Degree, Section 120.55 - Stalking in the Second Degree, Section 120.60 - Stalking in the First Degree, Section 135.60 - Coercion in the Second Degree, Section 105.00 - Conspiracy in the Sixth Degree, Section 120.15 - Menacing in the Third Degree.]
Under 17 U.S.C. 504, the consequences of copyright infringement include statutory damages of between $750 and $30,000 per work, at the discretion of the court, and damages of up to $150,000 per work for willful infringement. If you continue to engage in copyright infringement after receiving this letter, your actions will be evidence of “willful infringement.”
Grounds For Divorce: Adultery
The Domestic Relations Law, in Section 170(4), provides that an action may be maintained by a husband or wife to procure a judgment divorcing the parties and dissolving the marriage on the ground of the commission of an act of adultery.
Double Standard
In Westervelt v Westervelt,(1970) 26 NY2d 865, 309 NYS2d 604, 258 NE2d 98. On the other hand, a husband who spends some time in a hotel or motel room with the "other woman" may be subject to the presumption that "he sayeth not his pater nosters there." Kerr v. Kerr (1909) 134 App Div 141, 118 NYS 801.
In effect, a "double standard" may be inferred from the New York cases and it is easier to prove a husband's adultery from circumstantial evidence involving inclination and opportunity than it is to prove a wife's indiscretion. It may be more than coincidental that guilt of the latter formerly barred alimony whereas a husband's infidelity occasioned no comparable financial hardship except that unofficially it might enhance the alimony he had to pay.
George v. George (1970, 4th Dept) 34 App Div 2d 888, 313 NYS2d 85, held that the trial court had erred in finding that the defendant wife had committed adultery. The only testimony submitted was that a man visited the wife on various occasions while plaintiff was not at home. The court held that although such evidence might be considered on the issue of cruel and inhuman treatment, it was insufficient to support a finding of adultery. a complaint was dismissed despite proof that the wife had lived in her alleged lover's home for four months during which time she took contraceptive pills.
It is important to keep in mind that adultery, as distinguished from the other grounds for divorce in New York, is subject to the traditional defenses of recrimination, connivance, and condonation, and also to a five-year statute of limitations.
Definition
The Domestic Relations Law defines adultery as the commission of an act of sexual or deviate sexual intercourse, voluntarily performed by the defendant, with a person other than the plaintiff after the marriage of the plaintiff and the defendant. [Dom L 170, subd 4]. Deviate sexual intercourse includes, but is not limited to, sexual conduct as defined in Penal L 130:00, subd 2, and Penal L 130:20, subd 3. [Dom Rel L 170, subd 4.]
The Penal Law 130.00 says that "deviate sexual intercourse" "means sexual conduct between persons not married to each other consisting of contact between the penis and the anus, the mouth and penis, or the mouth and the vulva." Apparently, bestiality is omitted if the definition is taken literally since the reference is to deviate sexual intercourse with a "person."
In New York, as in most states, adultery is rarely prosecuted. In 1948, there were over 6,000 divorce cases based upon adultery but not a single prosecution for that offense. Between June 1959 and June 1960, there were 1700 divorce cases based on the adultery ground in New York City but no prosecutions. See Ploscowe, Sex And The Law, Ch 5 (1962 rev ed).
Proof of Adultery
In a divorce action grounded upon the adultery of the defendant, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the material allegations of his or her complaint, including the allegation of adultery, even though the defendant defaults in appearing or pleading, or the answer does not put in issue the allegation of adultery. [Dom Rel L 211]
Plaintiff must satisfactorily prove adultery even though defendant fails to deny factual allegations in complaint that he has been living with another woman from 1955 to present time. Kirshner v. Kirshner, (1959, 2d Dept.) 7 App Div 2d 202, 182 NYS2d 286.
An admission of adultery in an answer does not justify a finding that adultery has been committed by the efendant, since if this were true it would permit the granting of a divorce on the consent of the defendant. Taylor v. Taylor, (1908) 123 App Div 220, 108 NYS 428.
The Court of Appeals, in an understandably divided opinion, held in Sackler v. Sackler that proof as to a wife's adultery was admissible in a divorce action even though it had been obtained by means of an illegal search and seizure by a forcible entry into the wife's home by the husband and his hired detectives, the rule as to criminal cases having no application. Sackler v. Sackler, (1964) 15 NY2d 40, 255 NYS2d 83, 203 NE2d 481, 5 ALR3d 664.
The allegation that the defendant committed adultery with a certain specified person must be supported by testimony which identifies the person with whom the acts were committed as the person specified, Mondano v. Mondano, (1910, Sup) 122 NYS 731 and such an allegation is not supported by testimony establishing the fact that the plaintiff committed acts of adultery with persons other than the one named. Kane v. Kane, 3 Edw Ch. 389; Mondano v. Mondano, (1910, Sup. 122 NYS 731 But an allegation that the defendant committed adultery with a person whose name is unknown to the plaintiff is satisfactorily established by proof that the adultery alleged was committed with a person known as "May", Miller v. Miller, (1920) 194 App Div 183, 185 NYS 313 or with a person called ...., Mitchell v. Mitchell, (1875) 61 NY 398 or otherwise identified. Where the complaint contains an allegation of adultery with persons unknown to the plaintiff, the complaint will not be dismissed because the plaintiff does not establish by proof the former allegation, where he proves, under the latter allegation, that the defendant committed adultery with a certain person. Miller v. Miller, supra. The complaint will not be dismissed because the plaintiff did not establish by proof another allegation in his complaint that during the months of October, November and December, of a particular year, the defendant "committed adultery with a certain woman whose Christian name is `Julia', in the city of New York, and at various other places, which plaintiff is unable to state with more particularity.
Proof By Circumstantial Evidence
In an action for a divorce on the ground of adultery, there need not be direct evidence of the actual commission of the offense charged, Davidson v. Davidson (1909) 134 App Div 958, 119 NYS 141; Harris v. Harris (1903) 83 App Div 123, 82 NYS 568. since adulterous acts are usually secret and clandestine, and proof thereof ordinarily can be made only by circumstantial and indirect evidence. Yates v. Yates (1914) 211 NY 163, 105 NE 195; Mattison v. Mattison (1911) 203 NY 79, 96 NE 359; Cullen v. Cullen (1923) 205 App Div 276, 199 NYS 598; Cottrell v. Cottrell (1915) 165 App Div 693, 151 NYS 289; Shaw v. Shaw (1913) 155 App Div 252, 140 NYS 109. It is said the court "must take such evidence as the nature of the case permits, circumstantial, direct, or positive, and bringing to bear upon it the experiences and observations of life, and thus weighing it with prudence and care, give effect to its just preponderance." Moller v. Moller (1889) 115 NY 466, 22 NE 169. There are facts and circumstances which, unexplained, and in the line of the common experience of mankind, justify reaching the conclusion that the defendant has been guilty of adultery. Harris v. Harris (1903) 83 App Div 123, 82 NYS 568.
As to proof of nonaccess of plaintiff and subsequent birth of child, see Taylor v. Taylor (1908) 123 App Div 220, 108 NYS 428; Mayer v. Davis (1907) 122 App Div 393, 106 NYS 1041.
As to entries in hotel registers, and as to testimony upon which decree of divorce against the corespondent was granted, as evidence of act of adultery, see Mattison v. Mattison (1911) 203 NY 79, 96 NE 359.
It has frequently held that in order to establish a charge of adultery by circumstantial evidence, the plaintiff must prove opportunity, inclination, and intent. Trumpet v. Trumpet (1961, Sup) 215 NYS2d 921; Fleck v. Fleck (1957) 6 Misc 2d 202, 163 NYS2d 218; Brooks v. Brooks (1953, Sup) 120 NYS2d 335.
The following charge of the court was said to be able and instructive: "The burden is upon the plaintiff from first to last in the case. He must satisfy you by a fair preponderance of credible evidence of the two propositions which I have heretofore indicated to you: First, that these parties had the lascivious desire; and second, that they had the opportunity to gratify it, and third, that they did gratify it. That, however, you may find as an inference; that is to say, you are not called upon to receive direct proof of the fact, but, given the desire and intent and opportunity, you may if you are satisfied by a fair preponderance of credible evidence if you can say it is likely and probable, and necessarily followed from the preceding circumstances that they did commit the act you may find it, although no one saw it." Roth v. Roth (1904) 90 App Div 87, 85 NYS 640, affd 183 NY 520, 76 NE 1107. There must be evidence of some relation between the parties and such conduct on their part as would tend to establish that the desire and willingness existed to engage in an act of adultery when the opportunity arose [Brooks v. Brooks (1953, Sup) 120 NYS2d 335. Where the circumstances shown by the evidence were many, the opportunities frequent, and positive evidence of affection was openly shown, a finding of the court that the defendant was not guilty of adultery as charged was held to be against the weight of evidence. Cullen v. Cullen (1923) 205 App Div 276, 199 NYS 598]; proof of opportunity alone to commit adultery is not sufficient; [Pollock v. Pollock (1877) 71 NY 137; Bosch v. Bosch (1949) 275 App Div 1046, 91 NYS2d 841; Nottingham v. Nottingham (1924) 209 App Div 459, 204 NYS 750; Cottrell v. Cottrell (1915) 165 App Div 693, 151 NYS 289; Graham v. Graham (1913) 157 App Div 52, 141 NYS 766; Keville v. Keville (1907) 122 App Div 388, 106 NYS 993; Brooks v. Brooks (1953, Sup) 120 NYS2d 335.
The mere fact that the defendant and the corespondent were alone in the kitchen of the defendant's home from about 9:30 p.m. until midnight, at which time the plaintiff appeared, and that for the most of the time at least they were without a light, is not proof that the wrong has been done. Graham v. Graham (1913) 157 App Div 52, 141 NYS 766]; the evidence of inclination and intent must be clear, positive, and satisfactory, such as to lead a reasonable man to the conclusion that the adulterous act was committed when the opportunity was present. Brooks v. Brooks (1953, Sup) 120 NYS2d 335. Where it is shown that the parties charged with wrongdoing had the lascivious desire and the opportunity to gratify it, the fact that they did gratify it may be inferred from other facts. Kay v. Kay (1932) 235 App Div 25, 256 NYS 147; Rathje v. Rathje (1931) 232 App Div 664, 247 NYS 880; Roth v. Roth (1904) 90 App Div 87, 85 NYS 640, affd 183 NY 520, 76 NE 1107.
Evidence that the defendant met a woman who was not his wife at a railroad station, took her to a hotel where he registered both her and himself under an assumed name as husband and wife, had a room assigned to them upstairs in the hotel, ascended with her in the lift as if to the room, taking their baggage with him, and that neither of them was seen to come down, although the witness waited in the hotel until midnight, was held sufficient to justify an interlocutory decree of divorce, the court observing, "We have it of old that 'it is presumed he saith not a pater noster' there." Kerr v. Kerr (1909) 134 App Div 141, 118 NYS 801.
Since one act of adultery is sufficient grounds for divorce (Kay v. Kay (1932) 235 App Div 25, 256 NYS 147; Rathje v. Rathje (1931) 232 App Div 664, 247 NYS 880), and since the evidence of wife's adultery was "clear and convincing," the husband was entitled to a summary judgment for divorce. The defendant wife's own testimony clearly indicates that she committed adultery with one Ralph Nathan, and she does not deny this allegation in her reply affidavit, therefore plaintiff husband's motion for summary judgment is granted on his cause of action "adultery with a man or men whose name or names are unknown as well." Salomon v. Salomon (1979) 102 Misc 2d 427, 423 NYS2d 605.
It has also frequently been said that the evidence must be more consistent with guilt than with innocence in order to establish the charge of adultery by circumstantial evidence. Trumpet v. Trumpet (1961, Sup) 215 NYS2d 921; Fleck v. Fleck (1957) 6 Misc 2d 202, 163 NYS2d 218.
Where the evidence showed that the defendant and a woman not his wife registered at a hotel as man and wife, and later in the evening of the day on which they registered, were discovered in a room of the hotel partially disrobed, it was held error for the trial court to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the acts were as consistent with innocence as with guilt; such a conclusion was held not to be compatible with the acts of the parties. Miller v. Miller (1925) 212 App Div 114, 208 NYS 113.
Where circumstances are as consistent with innocence as with guilt, or are reconcilable with innocence, a presumption of guilt is not justified and the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Allen v. Allen (1886) 101 NY 658, 5 NE 341; Pollock v. Pollock (1877) 71 NY 137; Rolfe v. Rolfe (1935) 244 App Div 863, 279 NYS 796; Cottrell v. Cottrell (1915) 165 App Div 693, 151 NYS 289; Roth v. Roth (1904) 90 App Div 87, 85 NYS 640, affd 183 NY 520, 76 NE 1107; Brooks v. Brooks (1953, Sup) 120 NYS2d 335.The circumstantial evidence as to adultery need not be so strong as to admit of no other possible conclusion, [ Allen v. Allen (1886) 101 NY 658, 5 NE 341. Where the action for divorce was based on the adultery of the defendant with his mother-in-law, direct testimony of the offense was given by the son of the corespondent, and there was no denial under oath by either the defendant or the corespondent, it was held error to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the testimony was so inherently improbable as to be beyond belief. Gelbman v. Gelbman (1920) 194 App Div 137, 184 NYS 902 ]; or as to convince the court beyond all doubt, Fleck v. Fleck (1957) 6 Misc 2d 202, 163 NYS2d 218. but it should point clearly to guilt. Braun v. Braun (1935) 245 App Div 194, 281 NYS 25.
Circumstantial evidence was insufficient where it merely established that the wife was in another man's hotel room in a "shortie" nightgown and lucky Pierre was never placed in the room. Hess v. Hess (1966, 2d Dept) 25 App Div 2d 548, 267 NYS2d 537.
Proof By Testimony of Third Persons - The Paramour, Prostitute and Private Eye
In an action for divorce on the ground of adultery, the testimony of a correspondent as to intercourse with a spouse is said to be viewed with suspicion, and the courts will not generally grant a divorce based on such uncorroborated testimony. Glaser v. Glaser (1901) 36 Misc 231, 73 NYS 284; Delling v. Delling (1901) 34 Misc 122, 69 NYS 479; Fawcett v. Fawcett (1899) 29 Misc 673, 61 NYS 108. Because of the doubtful character and unreliability of testimony given by private detectives and prostitutes, such testimony is viewed with suspicion and is generally held to be insufficient to justify a judgment in favor of the party suing for a divorce because of defendant's adultery, without some corroboration. Winston v. Winston (1901) 165 NY 553, 59 NE 273, affd 189 US 506, 47 L Ed 922, 23 S Ct 852.
Regarding detectives, see Yates v. Yates (1914) 211 NY 163, 105 NE 195; Kruczek v. Kruczek (1942) 264 App Div 242, 35 NYS2d 289, affd 289 NY 826, 47 NE2d 434; Cottrell v. Cottrell (1915) 165 App Div 693, 151 NYS 289; Shaw v. Shaw (1913) 155 App Div 252, 140 NYS 109; Steele v. Steele (1918, Sup) 170 NYS 454. Regarding prostitutes, see McCarthy v. McCarthy (1894) 143 NY 235, 38 NE 288; Moller v. Moller (1889) 115 NY 466, 22 NE 169.
This does not apply to the testimony of a detective who obtained evidence without compensation through friendship to one of the parties, Yates v. Yates (1914) 211 NY 163, 105 NE 195, nor to the testimony of a person who was a witness to the sexual act, but not as a paid detective; in such instances there need be no corroboration to the testimony offered. Filocco v. Filocco (1942) 263 App Div 296, 32 NYS2d 552.
The rule requiring corroboration in certain cases is not a rule of evidence, but merely one for the guidance of the judicial conscience in uncontested cases, Yates v. Yates (1914) 211 NY 163, 105 NE 195; Simons v. Simons (1945) 270 App Div 88, 58 NYS2d 558; Trumpet v. Trumpet (1961, Sup) 215 NYS2d 921; Barber v. Barber (1953, Sup) 119 NYS2d 773; Steele v. Steele (1918, Sup) 170 NYS 454, and it is not followed as a matter of law in litigated cases where a jury is present to determine the issues of fact under proper instructions. Simons v. Simons (1945) 270 App Div 88, 58 NYS2d 558.
In other words, the rule is not that, as matter of law, such evidence could not be considered by a justice or jury, but rather that in the consideration of the same, only such weight should be given to it as the conscience of the judge or jurors shall deem it is entitled to receive. Yates v. Yates (1914) 211 NY 163, 105 NE 195. Therefore, it is error to charge the jury that the evidence of a private detective must be corroborated; a correct charge should state that the jury should consider the evidence of a private detective for what it is worth, considering the fact that he is a mercenary whose success and reward depend upon producing evidence favorable to the one hiring him. Braun v. Braun (1935) 245 App Div 194, 281 NYS 25. The rule is not one which affects a judgment rendered upon some evidence and affirmed upon review by the Appellate Division. Shaftan v. Shaftan (1932) 259 NY 527, 182 NE 166; Winston v. Winston (1901) 165 NY 553, 59 NE 273, affd 189 US 506, 47 L Ed 922, 23 S Ct 852. In such case, the judgment cannot be reversed by the Court of Appeals. Winston v. Winston, supra, where the court stated: "However the evidence may be criticized, with respect to its character, or to its weight, if it was such as to support the conclusions of the trial judge, or referee, and the judgment recovered is subsequently affirmed, the controversy should be deemed closed in this court."
Be that as it may, the courts, realizing the clandestine and secret nature of the offense sought to be proved in a case of this kind, have held very slight corroboration of the testimony of private detectives, or of prostitutes, to be sufficient to justify the granting of a divorce, See Yates v Yates (1914) 211 NY 163, 105 NE 195 and this is especially true where the party against whom the testimony is introduced fails to take the stand in his or her own behalf. Winston v. Winston (1901) 165 NY 553, 59 NE 273, affd 189 US 506, 47 L Ed 922, 23 S Ct 852; McCarthy v. McCarthy (1894) 143 NY 235, 38 NE 288; Moller v. Moller (1889) 115 NY 466, 22 NE 169.
The corroboration which such evidence should receive need not be sufficient, standing by itself, to prove the fact of adultery, but must simply be such as to justify a belief that the incriminating testimony given is true. Winston v. Winston, supra; Moller v. Moller (1889) 115 NY 466, 22 NE 169. Such corroboration may be found, for instance, in surrounding circumstances, Winston v. Winston (1901) 165 NY 553, 59 NE 273, affd 189 US 506, 47 L Ed 922, 23 S Ct 852 or in letters of the defendant to the corespondent. McCarthy v. McCarthy (1894) 143 NY 235, 38 NE 288; Moller v. Moller (1889) 115 NY 466, 22 NE 169.
By Proof of Divorce and Remarriage
In an action for divorce on the ground of adultery, proof of an invalid foreign divorce obtained by the defendant and a subsequent second marriage is insufficient to prove adultery, even though such proof is offered by the defendant. Taylor v. Taylor (1908) 123 App Div 220, 108 NYS 428. There must be proof of cohabitation with the second spouse in order to establish the adultery. Taylor v. Taylor, supra; Fox v. Fox (1960) 23 Misc 2d 504, 206 NYS2d 317. Where the plaintiff proves the remarriage of the defendant subsequent to the obtaining an invalid foreign judgment of divorce, and also proves that the defendant resided with his or her alleged second spouse, this is sufficient to authorize an inference of adultery. Hoyt v. Hoyt (1955) 286 App Div 580, 146 NYS2d 133.
Confessions
A judgment of divorce will not be granted based upon adultery solely upon the confessions of the parties. The policy reason for this rule is to avoid the danger of collusion, and to assure the courts that no imposition has been practiced upon them. The courts refuse to grant divorces upon a confession alone, but require some corroboration of the confession. Betts v. Betts, 1 Johns Ch 197; Rivett v. Rivett (1946) 270 App Div 878, 61 NYS2d 7; Buchanan v. Buchanan (1930) 229 App Div 631, 243 NYS 436; Monypeny v. Monypeny (1916) 171 App Div 134, 157 NYS 11; Irwin v. Irwin (1946, Sup) 69 NYS2d 780; Feraco v. Feraco (1946, Sup) 69 NYS2d 652; Madge v. Madge (1886, NY) 42 Hun 524; Anonymous, 17 Abb Pr 48; Lyon v. Lyon, 62 Barb 138. This rule, requiring corroboration of testimony in a divorce action, is not a rule of evidence, but is said to be one for the guidance of the judicial conscience. Barbara v. Barbara (1945, Sup) 57 NYS2d 156. It is not necessary that the corroboration should be sufficient, standing by itself, to prove the fact of adultery, or the other grounds upon which the divorce action is based. Monypeny v. Monypeny (1916) 171 App Div 134, 157 NYS 11; Lake v. Lake (1946, Sup) 60 NYS2d 105. It is only required that it shall tend to corroborate the fact stated in the confession.Monypeny v. Monypeny, supra.
It is said: "It is a rule of policy ....... not to found a sentence of divorce upon confession alone. Yet when it is full, confidential, reluctant, free from suspicion of collusion, and corroborated by circumstances, it is ranked with the safest proofs." Madge v. Madge (1886, NY) 42 Hun 524. Thus, if it is made to appear by evidence outside of his or her own confession that the defendant has done acts which it would be quite natural and probable that he or she would do if the facts stated in the confession were true, but quite unnatural and improbable if the confession were untrue, there is presented some corroboration of the truth of the confession.
A confession of a party to a divorce action which is clear and distinct, sincere and not collusive, corroborated by the correspondence of the guilty party or other evidence, constitutes a sufficient basis for a judgment of divorce. Madge v. Madge (1886, NY) 42 Hun 524.
The testimony of a policeman that he had seen plaintiff chasing defendant, that he intercepted plaintiff who accused defendant of having illicit relations with a doctor at his office, that all three of them went to the doctor's office where the doctor and defendant admitted their guilt was sufficient corroboration of the out-of-court confessions of adultery of the defendant and of the correspondent to warrant granting plaintiff a divorce in his uncontested action against defendant. Crowley v. Crowley (1959) 18 Misc 2d 586, 186 NYS2d 60.
It was held in Stetson v. Stetson (1914, Sup) 146 NYS 245, that an admission by a defendant in an action for divorce is not sufficiently corroborated to justify the granting of the divorce, by a record of criminal prosecution against the defendant, showing that he had transported the corespondent to another city for the purpose of committing adultery with her, since there was no allegation in the criminal prosecution of cohabitation or unlawful intercourse, the conviction proved only an intent to commit adultery and some steps taken to carry out that intent. An admission of adultery by a party to a divorce action is not corroborated by his or her testimony that he or she received certain letters from a correspondent indicating the acts of adultery, since it will constitute merely an admission to corroborate an admission. Lake v. Lake (1946, Sup) 60 NYS2d 105.
Sexual intercourse by an adult with a person:
RAPE
The criminal offense of statutory rape is committed when an adult sexually penetrates a person who, under the law, is incapable of consenting to sex. Minors and physically and mentally incapacitated persons are deemed incapable of consenting to sex under rape statutes in all states. These persons are considered deserving of special protection because they are especially vulnerable due to their youth or condition.
Most legislatures include statutory rape provisions in statutes that punish a number of different types of sexual assault. Statutory rape is different from other types of rape in that force and lack of consent are not necessary for conviction. A defendant may be convicted of statutory rape even if the complainant explicitly consented to the sexual contact and no force was used by the actor. By contrast, other rape generally occurs when a person overcomes another person by force and without the person's consent.
The actor's age is an important factor in statutory rape where the offense is based on the victim's age. Furthermore, a defendant may not argue that he was mistaken as to the minor's age or incapacity. Most rape statutes specify that a rape occurs when the complainant is under a certain age and the perpetrator is over a certain age. In Minnesota, for example, criminal sexual conduct in the first degree is defined as sexual contact with a person under thirteen years of age by a person who is more than thirty-six months older than the victim. The offense also is committed if the complainant is between thirteen and sixteen years old and the actor is more than forty-eight months older than the complainant (Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.342 [West 1996]).
S 130.00 Sex offenses; definitions of terms.
The following definitions are applicable to this article:
1. "Sexual intercourse" has its ordinary meaning and occurs upon any
penetration, however slight.
2. "Deviate sexual intercourse" means sexual conduct between persons
not married to each other consisting of contact between the penis and
the anus, the mouth and penis, or the mouth and the vulva.
3. "Sexual contact" means any touching of the sexual or other intimate
parts of a person not married to the actor for the purpose of gratifying
sexual desire of either party. It includes the touching of the actor by
the victim, as well as the touching of the victim by the actor, whether
directly or through clothing.
4. "Female" means any female person who is not married to the actor.
For the purposes of this article "not married" means:
(a) the lack of an existing relationship of husband and wife between
the female and the actor which is recognized by law, or
(b) the existence of the relationship of husband and wife between the
actor and the female which is recognized by law at the time the actor
commits an offense proscribed by this article by means of forcible
compulsion against the female, and the female and actor are living apart
at such time pursuant to a valid and effective:
(i) order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction which by its
terms or in its effect requires such living apart, or
(ii) decree or judgment of separation, or
(iii) written agreement of separation subscribed by them and
acknowledged in the form required to entitle a deed to be recorded which
contains provisions specifically indicating that the actor may be guilty
of the commission of a crime for engaging in conduct which constitutes
an offense proscribed by this article against and without the consent of
the female.
5. "Mentally disabled" means that a person suffers from a mental
disease or defect which renders him or her incapable of appraising the
nature of his or her conduct.
6. "Mentally incapacitated" means that a person is rendered
temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling his conduct owing to
the influence of a narcotic or intoxicating substance administered to
him without his consent, or to any other act committed upon him without
his consent.
7. "Physically helpless" means that a person is unconscious or for any
other reason is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an
act.
8. "Forcible compulsion" means to compel by either:
a. use of physical force; or
b. a threat, express or implied, which places a person in fear of
immediate death or physical injury to himself, herself or another
person, or in fear that he, she or another person will immediately be
kidnapped.
9. "Foreign object" means any instrument or article which, when
inserted in the vagina, urethra, penis or rectum, is capable of causing
physical injury.
10. "Sexual conduct" means sexual intercourse, deviate sexual
intercourse, aggravated sexual contact, or sexual contact.
11. "Aggravated sexual contact" means inserting, other than for a
valid medical purpose, a foreign object in the vagina, urethra, penis or
rectum of a child, thereby causing physical injury to such child.
12. "Health care provider" means any person who is, or is required to
be, licensed or registered or holds himself or herself out to be
licensed or registered, or provides services as if he or she were
licensed or registered in the profession of medicine, chiropractic,
dentistry or podiatry under any of the following: article one hundred
thirty-one, one hundred thirty-two, one hundred thirty-three, or one
hundred forty-one of the education law.
13. "Mental health care provider" means any person who is, or is
required to be, licensed or registered, or holds himself or herself out
to be licensed or registered, or provides mental health services as if
he or she were licensed or registered in the profession of medicine,
psychology or social work under any of the following: article one
hundred thirty-one, one hundred fifty-three, or one hundred fifty-four
of the education law.
S 130.05 Sex offenses; lack of consent.
1. Whether or not specifically stated, it is an element of every
offense defined in this article, except the offense of consensual
sodomy, that the sexual act was committed without consent of the victim.
2. Lack of consent results from:
(a) Forcible compulsion; or
(b) Incapacity to consent; or
(c) Where the offense charged is sexual abuse, any circumstances, in
addition to forcible compulsion or incapacity to consent, in which the
victim does not expressly or impliedly acquiesce in the actor`s conduct;
or
(d) Where the offense charged is rape in the third degree as defined
in subdivision three of section 130.25, or sodomy in the third degree as
defined in subdivision three of section 130.40, in addition to forcible
compulsion, circumstances under which, at the time of the act of
intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse, the victim clearly expressed
that he or she did not consent to engage in such act, and a reasonable
person in the actor`s situation would have understood such person`s
words and acts as an expression of lack of consent to such act under all
the circumstances.
3. A person is deemed incapable of consent when he or she is:
(a) less than seventeen years old; or
(b) mentally disabled; or
(c) mentally incapacitated; or
(d) physically helpless; or
(e) committed to the care and custody of the state department of
correctional services or a hospital, as such term is defined in
subdivision two of section four hundred of the correction law, and the
actor is an employee, not married to such person, who knows or
reasonably should know that such person is committed to the care and
custody of such department or hospital. For purposes of this paragraph,
"employee" means (i) an employee of the state department of correctional
services who performs professional duties in a state correctional
facility consisting of providing custody, medical or mental health
services, counseling services, educational programs, or vocational
training for inmates;
(ii) an employee of the division of parole who performs professional
duties in a state correctional facility and who provides institutional
parole services pursuant to section two hundred fifty-nine-e of the
executive law;
or
(iii) an employee of the office of mental health who performs
professional duties in a state correctional facility or hospital, as
such term is defined in subdivision two of section four hundred of the
correction law, consisting of providing custody, or medical or mental
health services for such inmates; or
(f) committed to the care and custody of a local correctional
facility, as such term is defined in subdivision two of section forty of
the correction law, and the actor is an employee, not married to such
person, who knows or reasonably should know that such person is
committed to the care and custody of such facility. For purposes of this
paragraph, "employee" means an employee of the local correctional
facility where the person is committed who performs professional duties
consisting of providing custody, medical or mental health services,
counseling services, educational services, or vocational training for
inmates;
or
(g) committed to or placed with the office of children and family
services and in residential care, and the actor is an employee, not
married to such person, who knows or reasonably should know that such
person is committed to or placed with such office of children and family
services and in residential care. For purposes of this paragraph,
"employee" means an employee of the office of children and family
services or of a residential facility who performs duties consisting of
providing custody, medical or mental health services, counseling
services, educational services, or vocational training for persons
committed to or placed with the office of children and family services
and in residential care; or
(h) a client or patient and the actor is a health care provider or
mental health care provider charged with rape in the third degree as
defined in section 130.25, sodomy in the third degree as defined in
section 130.40, aggravated sexual abuse in the fourth degree as defined
in section 130.65-a, or sexual abuse in the third degree as defined in
section 130.55, and the act of sexual conduct occurs during a treatment
session, consultation, interview, or examination.
S 130.10 Sex offenses; limitation; defenses.
1. In any prosecution under this article in which the victim`s lack of
consent is based solely upon his or her incapacity to consent because he
or she was mentally disabled, mentally incapacitated or physically
helpless, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant, at the time
he or she engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know
of the facts or conditions responsible for such incapacity to consent.
2. Conduct performed for a valid medical or mental health care purpose
shall not constitute a violation of any section of this article in which
incapacity to consent is based on the circumstances set forth in
paragraph (h) of subdivision three of section 130.05 of this article.
3. In any prosecution for the crime of rape in the third degree as
defined in section 130.25, sodomy in the third degree as defined in
section 130.40, aggravated sexual abuse in the fourth degree as defined
in section 130.65-a, or sexual abuse in the third degree as defined in
section 130.55 in which incapacity to consent is based on the
circumstances set forth in paragraph (h) of subdivision three of section
130.05 of this article it shall be an affirmative defense that the
client or patient consented to such conduct charged after having been
expressly advised by the health care or mental health care provider that
such conduct was not performed for a valid medical purpose.
S 130.16 Sex offenses; corroboration.
A person shall not be convicted of consensual sodomy, or an attempt to
commit the same, or of any offense defined in this article of which lack
of consent is an element but results solely from incapacity to consent
because of the victim`s mental defect, or mental incapacity, or an
attempt to commit the same, solely on the testimony of the victim,
unsupported by other evidence tending to:
(a) Establish that an attempt was made to engage the victim in sexual
intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, or sexual contact, as the case
may be, at the time of the occurrence; and
(b) Connect the defendant with the commission of the offense or
attempted offense.
S 130.20 Sexual misconduct.
A person is guilty of sexual misconduct when:
1. He or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person without
such person`s consent; or
2. He or she engages in oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct
with another person without such person's consent; or
3. He or she engages in sexual conduct with an animal or a dead human
body.
Sexual misconduct is a class A misdemeanor.
S 130.25 Rape in the third degree.
A person is guilty of rape in the third degree when:
1. He or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person who is
incapable of consent by reason of some factor other than being less than
seventeen years old;
2. Being twenty-one years old or more, he or she engages in sexual
intercourse with another person less than seventeen years old; or
3. He or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person without
such person`s consent where such lack of consent is by reason of some
factor other than incapacity to consent.
Rape in the third degree is a class E felony.
S 130.30 Rape in the second degree.
A person is guilty of rape in the second degree when:
1. being eighteen years old or more, he or she engages in sexual
intercourse with another person less than fifteen years old; or
2. he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person who is
incapable of consent by reason of being mentally disabled or mentally
incapacitated.
It shall be an affirmative defense to the crime of rape in the second
degree as defined in subdivision one of this section that the defendant
was less than four years older than the victim at the time of the act.
Rape in the second degree is a class D felony.
S 130.35 Rape in the first degree.
A person is guilty of rape in the first degree when he or she engages
in sexual intercourse with another person:
1. By forcible compulsion; or
2. Who is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless;
or
3. Who is less than eleven years old; or
4. Who is less than thirteen years old and the actor is eighteen years
old or more.
Rape in the first degree is a class B felony.
S 130.40 Criminal sexual act in the third degree.
A person is guilty of criminal sexual act in the third degree when:
1. He or she engages in oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct
with a person who is incapable of consent by reason of some factor other
than being less than seventeen years old;
2. Being twenty-one years old or more, he or she engages in oral
sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct with a person less than seventeen
years old; or
3. He or she engages in oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct
with another person without such person's consent where such lack of
consent is by reason of some factor other than incapacity to consent.
Criminal sexual act in the third degree is a class E felony.
S 130.45 Criminal sexual act in the second degree.
A person is guilty of criminal sexual act in the second degree when:
1. being eighteen years old or more, he or she engages in oral sexual
conduct or anal sexual conduct with another person less than fifteen
years old; or
2. he or she engages in oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct
with another person who is incapable of consent by reason of being
mentally disabled or mentally incapacitated.
It shall be an affirmative defense to the crime of criminal sexual act
in the second degree as defined in subdivision one of this section that
the defendant was less than four years older than the victim at the time
of the act.
Criminal sexual act in the second degree is a class D felony.
S 130.50 Criminal sexual act in the first degree.
A person is guilty of criminal sexual act in the first degree when he
or she engages in oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct with
another person:
1. By forcible compulsion; or
2. Who is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless;
or
3. Who is less than eleven years old; or
4. Who is less than thirteen years old and the actor is eighteen years
old or more.
Criminal sexual act in the first degree is a class B felony.
S 130.52 Forcible touching.
A person is guilty of forcible touching when such person
intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, forcibly touches the
sexual or other intimate parts of another person:
1. for the purpose of degrading or abusing such person; or
2. for the purpose of gratifying the actor`s sexual desire.
For the purposes of this section, forcible touching includes the
squeezing, grabbing or pinching of such other person`s sexual or other
intimate parts.
Forcible touching is a class A misdemeanor.
S 130.53 Persistent sexual abuse.
A person is guilty of persistent sexual abuse when he or she stands
convicted of sexual abuse in the third degree, as defined in section
130.55 of this article, or sexual abuse in the second degree, as defined
in section 130.60 of this article, and, within the previous ten year
period, has been convicted two or more times, in separate criminal
transactions for which sentence was imposed on separate occasions, of
sexual abuse in the third degree as defined in section 130.55 of this
article, or sexual abuse in the second degree, as defined in section
130.60 of this article.
Persistent sexual abuse is a class E felony.
S 130.55 Sexual abuse in the third degree.
A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the third degree when he or she
subjects another person to sexual contact without the latter`s consent;
except that in any prosecution under this section, it is an affirmative
defense that (a) such other person`s lack of consent was due solely to
incapacity to consent by reason of being less than seventeen years old,
and (b) such other person was more than fourteen years old, and (c) the
defendant was less than five years older than such other person.
Sexual abuse in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.
S 130.60 Sexual abuse in the second degree.
A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the second degree when he or she
subjects another person to sexual contact and when such other person is:
1. Incapable of consent by reason of some factor other than being less
than seventeen years old; or
2. Less than fourteen years old.
Sexual abuse in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
S 130.65 Sexual abuse in the first degree.
A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree when he or she
subjects another person to sexual contact:
1. By forcible compulsion; or
2. When the other person is incapable of consent by reason of being
physically helpless; or
3. When the other person is less than eleven years old.
Sexual abuse in the first degree is a class D felony.
S 130.65-a Aggravated sexual abuse in the fourth degree.
1. A person is guilty of aggravated sexual abuse in the fourth degree
when:
(a) He or she inserts a foreign object in the vagina, urethra, penis
or rectum of another person and the other person is incapable of consent
by reason of some factor other than being less than seventeen years old;
or
(b) He or she inserts a finger in the vagina, urethra, penis or rectum
of another person causing physical injury to such person and such person
is incapable of consent by reason of some factor other than being less
than seventeen years old.
2. Conduct performed for a valid medical purpose does not violate the
provisions of this section.
Aggravated sexual abuse in the fourth degree is a class E felony.
S 130.66 Aggravated sexual abuse in the third degree.
1. A person is guilty of aggravated sexual abuse in the third degree
when he inserts a foreign object in the vagina, urethra, penis or rectum
of another person:
(a) By forcible compulsion; or
(b) When the other person is incapable of consent by reason of being
physically helpless; or
(c) When the other person is less than eleven years old.
2. A person is guilty of aggravated sexual abuse in the third degree
when he or she inserts a foreign object in the vagina, urethra, penis or
rectum of another person causing physical injury to such person and such
person is incapable of consent by reason of being mentally disabled or
mentally incapacitated.
3. Conduct performed for a valid medical purpose does not violate the
provisions of this section.
Aggravated sexual abuse in the third degree is a class D felony.
S 130.67 Aggravated sexual abuse in the second degree.
1. A person is guilty of aggravated sexual abuse in the second degree
when he inserts a finger in the vagina, urethra, penis, or rectum of
another person causing physical injury to such person:
(a) By forcible compulsion; or
(b) When the other person is incapable of consent by reason of being
physically helpless; or
(c) When the other person is less than eleven years old.
2. Conduct performed for a valid medical purpose does not violate the
provisions of this section.
Aggravated sexual abuse in the second degree is a class C felony.
S 130.70 Aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree.
1. A person is guilty of aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree
when he inserts a foreign object in the vagina, urethra, penis or rectum
of another person causing physical injury to such person:
(a) By forcible compulsion; or
(b) When the other person is incapable of consent by reason of being
physically helpless; or
(c) When the other person is less than eleven years old.
2. Conduct performed for a valid medical purpose does not violate the
provisions of this section.
Aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree is a class B felony.
S 130.75 Course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree.
1. A person is guilty of course of sexual conduct against a child in
the first degree when, over a period of time not less than three months
in duration:
(a) he or she engages in two or more acts of sexual conduct, which
includes at least one act of sexual intercourse, deviate sexual
intercourse or aggravated sexual contact, with a child less than eleven
years old; or
(b) he or she, being eighteen years old or more, engages in two or
more acts of sexual conduct, which includes at least one act of sexual
intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or aggravated sexual contact,
with a child less than thirteen years old.
2. A person may not be subsequently prosecuted for any other sexual
offense involving the same victim unless the other charged offense
occurred outside the time period charged under this section.
Course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree is a class B felony.
S 130.80 Course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree.
1. A person is guilty of course of sexual conduct against a child in
the second degree when, over a period of time not less than three months
in duration:
(a) he or she engages in two or more acts of sexual conduct with a
child less than eleven years old; or
(b) he or she, being eighteen years old or more, engages in two or
more acts of sexual conduct with a child less than thirteen years old.
2. A person may not be subsequently prosecuted for any other sexual
offense involving the same victim unless the other charged offense
occurred outside the time period charged under this section.
Course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree is a class D felony.
S 130.85 Female genital mutilation.
1. A person is guilty of female genital mutilation when:
(a) a person knowingly circumcises, excises, or infibulates the whole
or any part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris of another
person who has not reached eighteen years of age; or
(b) being a parent, guardian or other person legally responsible and
charged with the care or custody of a child less than eighteen years
old, he or she knowingly consents to the circumcision, excision or
infibulation of whole or part of such child`s labia majora or labia
minora or clitoris.
2. Such circumcision, excision, or infibulation is not a violation of
this section if such act is:
(a) necessary to the health of the person on whom it is performed, and
is performed by a person licensed in the place of its performance as a
medical practitioner; or
(b) performed on a person in labor or who has just given birth and is
performed for medical purposes connected with that labor or birth by a
person licensed in the place it is performed as a medical practitioner,
midwife, or person in training to become such a practitioner or midwife.
3. For the purposes of paragraph (a) of subdivision two of this
section, no account shall be taken of the effect on the person on whom
such procedure is to be performed of any belief on the part of that or
any other person that such procedure is required as a matter of custom
or ritual.
Female genital mutilation is a class E felony.
S 130.90 Facilitating a sex offense with a controlled substance.
A person is guilty of facilitating a sex offense with a controlled
substance when he or she:
1. knowingly and unlawfully possesses a controlled substance and
administers such substance to another person without such person`s
consent and with intent to commit against such person conduct
constituting a felony defined in this article; and
2. commits or attempts to commit such conduct.
Facilitating a sex offense with a controlled substance is a class D felony.
§ 130.91 Sexually motivated felony.
1. A person commits a sexually motivated felony when he or she commits
a specified offense for the purpose, in whole or substantial part, of
his or her own direct sexual gratification.
2. A "specified offense" is a felony offense defined by any of the
following provisions of this chapter: assault in the second degree as
defined in section 120.05, assault in the first degree as defined in
section 120.10, gang assault in the second degree as defined in section
120.06, gang assault in the first degree as defined in section 120.07,
stalking in the first degree as defined in section 120.60, manslaughter
in the second degree as defined in subdivision one of section 125.15,
manslaughter in the first degree as defined in section 125.20, murder in
the second degree as defined in section 125.25, aggravated murder as
defined in section 125.26, murder in the first degree as defined in
section 125.27, kidnapping in the second degree as defined in section
135.20, kidnapping in the first degree as defined in section 135.25,
burglary in the third degree as defined in section 140.20, burglary in
the second degree as defined in section 140.25, burglary in the first
degree as defined in section 140.30, arson in the second degree as
defined in section 150.15, arson in the first degree as defined in
section 150.20, robbery in the third degree as defined in section
160.05, robbery in the second degree as defined in section 160.10,
robbery in the first degree as defined in section 160.15, promoting
prostitution in the second degree as defined in section 230.30,
promoting prostitution in the first degree as defined in section 230.32,
compelling prostitution as defined in section 230.33, disseminating
indecent material to minors in the first degree as defined in section
235.22, use of a child in a sexual performance as defined in section
263.05, promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child as defined in
section 263.10, promoting a sexual performance by a child as defined in
section 263.15, or any felony attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the
foregoing offenses.
S 130.92 Sentencing.
1. When a person is convicted of a sexually motivated felony pursuant
to this article, and the specified felony is a violent felony offense,
as defined in section 70.02 of this chapter, the sexually motivated
felony shall be deemed a violent felony offense.
2. When a person is convicted of a sexually motivated felony pursuant
to this article, the sexually motivated felony shall be deemed to be the
same offense level as the specified offense the defendant committed.
3. Persons convicted of a sexually motivated felony as defined in
section 130.91 of this article, must be sentenced in accordance with the
provisions of section 70.80 of this chapter.
S 130.95 Predatory sexual assault.
A person is guilty of predatory sexual assault when he or she commits
the crime of rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first
degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree, or course of sexual
conduct against a child in the first degree, as defined in this article,
and when:
1. In the course of the commission of the crime or the immediate
flight therefrom, he or she:
(a) Causes serious physical injury to the victim of such crime; or
(b) Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument; or
2. He or she has engaged in conduct constituting the crime of rape in
the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, aggravated
sexual abuse in the first degree, or course of sexual conduct against a
child in the first degree, as defined in this article, against one or
more additional persons; or
3. He or she has previously been subjected to a conviction for a
felony defined in this article, incest as defined in section 255.25 of
this chapter or use of a child in a sexual performance as defined in
section 263.05 of this chapter.
Predatory sexual assault is a class A-II felony.
S 130.96 Predatory sexual assault against a child.
A person is guilty of predatory sexual assault against a child when,
being eighteen years old or more, he or she commits the crime of rape in
the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, aggravated
sexual abuse in the first degree, or course of sexual conduct against a
child in the first degree, as defined in this article, and the victim is
less than thirteen years old.
Predatory sexual assault against a child is a class A-II felony.
§ 70.80 Sentences of imprisonment for conviction of a felony sex
offense.
1. Definitions.
(a) For the purposes of this section, a "felony sex offense" means a
conviction of any felony defined in article one hundred thirty of this
chapter, including a sexually motivated felony, or patronizing a
prostitute in the first degree as defined in section 230.06 of this
chapter, incest in the second degree as defined in section 255.26 of
this chapter, or incest in the first degree as defined in section 255.27
of this chapter, or a felony attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the
above.
(b) A felony sex offense shall be deemed a "violent felony sex
offense" if it is for an offense defined as a violent felony offense in
section 70.02 of this article, or for a sexually motivated felony as
defined in section 130.91 of this chapter where the specified offense is
a violent felony offense as defined in section 70.02 of this article.
(c) For the purposes of this section, a "predicate felony sex
offender" means a person who stands convicted of any felony sex offense
as defined in paragraph (a) of this subdivision, other than a class A-I
felony, after having previously been subjected to one or more predicate
felony convictions as defined in subdivision one of section 70.06 or
subdivision one of section 70.04 of this article.
(d) For purposes of this section, a "violent felony offense" is any
felony defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 of this article, and
a "non-violent felony offense" is any felony not defined therein.
2. In imposing a sentence within the authorized statutory range for
any felony sex offense, the court may consider all relevant factors set
forth in section 1.05 of this chapter, and in particular, may consider
the defendant's criminal history, if any, including any history of sex
offenses; any mental illness or mental abnormality from which the
defendant may suffer; the defendant's ability or inability to control
his sexual behavior; and, if the defendant has difficulty controlling
such behavior, the extent to which that difficulty may pose a threat to
society.
3. Except as provided by subdivision four, five, six, seven or eight
of this section, or when a defendant is being sentenced for a conviction
of the class A-II felonies of predat |
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predatory sexual assault and predatory
sexual assault against a child as defined in sections 130.95 and 130.96
of this chapter, or for any class A-I sexually motivated felony for
which a life sentence or a life without parole sentence must be imposed,
a sentence imposed upon a defendant convicted of a felony sex offense
shall be a determinate sentence. The determinate sentence shall be
imposed by the court in whole or half years, and shall include as a part
thereof a period of post-release supervision in accordance with
subdivision two-a of section 70.45 of this article. Persons eligible for
sentencing under section 70.07 of this article governing second child
sexual assault felonies shall be sentenced under such section and
paragraph (j) of subdivision two-a of section 70.45 of this article.
4. (a) Sentences of imprisonment for felony sex offenses. Except as
provided in subdivision five, six, seven, or eight of this section, the
term of the determinate sentence must be fixed by the court as follows:
(i) for a class B felony, the term must be at least five years and
must not exceed twenty-five years;
(ii) for a class C felony, the term must be at least three and
one-half years and must not exceed fifteen years;
(iii) for a class D felony, the term must be at least two years and
must not exceed seven years; and
(iv) for a class E felony, the term must be at least one and one-half
years and must not exceed four years.
(b) Probation. The court may sentence a defendant convicted of a class
D or class E felony sex offense to probation in accordance with the
provisions of section 65.00 of this title.
(c) Alternative definite sentences for class D and class E felony sex
offenses. If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of
the crime and to the history and character of the defendant, is of the
opinion that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary but that it would
be unduly harsh to impose a determinate sentence upon a person convicted
of a class D or class E felony sex offense, the court may impose a
definite sentence of imprisonment and fix a term of one year or less.
5. Sentence of imprisonment for a predicate felony sex offender. (a)
Applicability. This subdivision shall apply to a predicate felony sex
offender who stands convicted of a non-violent felony sex offense and
who was previously convicted of one or more felonies.
(b) Non-violent predicate felony offense. When the court has found,
pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person
is a predicate felony sex offender, and the person's predicate
conviction was for a non-violent felony offense, the court must impose a
determinate sentence of imprisonment, the term of which must be fixed by
the court as follows:
(i) for a class B felony, the term must be at least eight years and
must not exceed twenty-five years;
(ii) for a class C felony, the term must be at least five years and
must not exceed fifteen years;
(iii) for a class D felony, the term must be at least three years and
must not exceed seven years; and
(iv) for a class E felony, the term must be at least two years and
must not exceed four years.
(c) Violent predicate felony offense. When the court has found,
pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person
is a predicate felony sex offender, and the person's predicate
conviction was for a violent felony offense, the court must impose a
determinate sentence of imprisonment, the term of which must be fixed by
the court as follows:
(i) for a class B felony, the term must be at least nine years and
must not exceed twenty-five years;
(ii) for a class C felony, the term must be at least six years and
must not exceed fifteen years;
(iii) for a class D felony, the term must be at least four years and
must not exceed seven years; and
(iv) for a class E felony, the term must be at least two and one-half
years and must not exceed four years.
(d) A defendant who stands convicted of a non-violent felony sex
offense, other than a class A-I or class A-II felony, who is adjudicated
a persistent felony offender under section 70.10 of this article, shall
be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of section 70.10 or pursuant to
this subdivision.
6. Sentence of imprisonment for a violent felony sex offense. Except
as provided in subdivisions seven and eight of this section, a defendant
who stands convicted of a violent felony sex offense must be sentenced
pursuant to the provisions of section 70.02, section 70.04, subdivision
six of section 70.06, section 70.08, or section 70.10 of this article,
as applicable.
7. Sentence for a class A felony sex offense. When a person stands
convicted of a sexually motivated felony pursuant to section 130.91 of
this chapter and the specified offense is a class A felony, the court
must sentence the defendant in accordance with the provisions of:
(a) section 60.06 of this chapter and section 70.00 of this article,
as applicable, if such offense is a class A-I felony; and
(b) section 70.00, 70.06 or 70.08 of this article, as applicable, if
such offense is a class A-II felony.
8. Whenever a juvenile offender stands convicted of a felony sex
offense, he or she must be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of
sections 60.10 and 70.05 of this chapter.
9. Every determinate sentence for a felony sex offense, as defined in
paragraph (a) of subdivision one of this section, imposed pursuant to
any section of this article, shall include as a part thereof a period of
post-release supervision in accordance with subdivision two-a of section
70.45 of this article.
Continued harassment from you will result in legal actions from our attorney. Should you willfully choose to continue your current course of action, we will not hesitate to file a complaint with the Police Department for your ongoing violations of the Criminal Laws noted previously. In fact, since you've violated my previous request to not contact me, I will be contacting the police department and lawyer to protect myself from you. You know what you've done to me in the past and I'm afraid for my safety from you. Stay away! Your wife needs to know what you've done to me and other women. All NY State license agencies need to know of your unprofessional and illegal behaviors towards women. Rape, soliciting women as prostitutes, and adultery are all illegal.
This letter does not constitute exhaustive statement of my position nor is it a waiver of any of my rights and/or remedies in this and/or any other related matter.
We demand your immediate compliance. Stay away from me and my family, friends, and colleagues. You are an unstable individual, married, and sexually harassing me. Stay away. |
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| give me a break! no one needed that much info. |
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| He picked me up in a bar in NYC and offered me money for sex. His poor wife |
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NOTICE:
If you have been raped or sexually assulted, been paid for prostitution, or date raped by Patrick B. Hannon, in a hotel bar or lobby (his favorite operative locations), or know any women that have been harassed by him online, by telephone, in person solicited or sexually abused or sexually touched in any NYC bar or hotel, then please contact the New York City Police Department, Special Victims Unit for Sexual Crimes. He is believed to have approached many other women. Recently, many women are starting to come forward to report their sex crimes. If you have been raped, sexually harassed, approached or enganged in prostitution with this person, either in person or online then please contact:
New York City Police Department
The New York City Police Department Special Victims Unit investigates sex crimes. It is housed in separate Borough Patrols (i.e. Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens). In addition to the different name, the Special Victims Squad only investigates the following types of cases:
Any child under 13 years of age who is the victim of any sex crime or attempted sex crime
Any child under 11 years of age who is the victim of abuse by a parent or person legally responsible for the care of the child
Any victim of rape (all degrees) or attempted rape (all degrees)
Any victim of Criminal Sexual Act (all degrees) or Attempted Criminal Sexual Act (all degrees)
Victims of Aggravated Sexual Abuse (all degrees)
Victims of Sexual Abuse 1st Degree
The Special Victims Unit does not investigate any murder, robbery or child pornography cases. Murders and robberies are investigated by precinct detective squads. If a sex crime is involved, the Special Victims Squad may assist in the investigation. Child pornography is investigated by the NYPD Vice Enforcement Sexual Exploitation of Children Unit.
IMPORTANT NUMBERS:
New York County District Attorney’s Office Sex Crimes Unit
One Hogan Place
Room 666
New York, NY 10013
212-335-9373 (Hotline)
Lisa Friel, Chief
Jennifer Gaffney & Coleen Balbert, Deputy Chiefs
Northern Manhattan Office
Located in the Harlem State Office Building
163 West 125th Street
7th Floor
New York, NY 10027
212-864-7884
Witness Aid Services Unit
100 Centre Street
Room 231
New York, NY 10013
212-335-9040
212-335-9500 (TTY)
Hospital-based rape crisis programs
Bellevue Hospital Center
1st Avenue at 27th Street
212-562-3435
Beth Israel Medical Center
317 East 17th Street
212-420-4516
Harlem Hospital
506 Lenox Avenue
212-939-4621
Mt. Sinai Sexual Assault Violence
Intervention Program
One Gustav Levy Place
(98th Street/ Madison Avenue)
212-423-2140
New York Presbyterian Hospital
(formerly Columbia Presbyterian)
622 West 168th St.
212-305-9060
New York Presbyterian Hospital
(formerly New York Cornell)
525 East 68th Street
212-746-4328
St. Luke’s Roosevelt Hospital Rape Crisis
Intervention Program
411 West 114th Street
212-523-4728
NYPD Sex Crimes Report Line
212-267-RAPE
Community-based programs
Ackerman Institute for the Family
149 East 78th Street
212-879-4900 x 122
Barrier-Free Living, Inc
212-677-6668 (voice / tdd)
Asian Women’s Center
212-732-5230
NYC Gay/Lesbian Anti-Violence Project
212-714-1141
Korean American Family Center
212-465-0664
National Organization for Women (NOW)
Rape Support
212-598-4218
New York Police Department resources and services for victims of sexual assault:
Sex Crimes Report Line:1-212-267-RAPE
Safe Horizon Sexual Assault Hotline
212-267-3000
IMPORTANT GUIDELINES FOR VICTIMS
Criminal cases are prosecuted by the District Attorney’s Office on behalf of the People of the State of New York. Victims are not required to obtain an attorney.
As a crime victim, you are a witness in the prosecution of your case.
As a witness for the State, a victim has certain responsibilities to assist with the prosecution of a criminal case. These responsibilities may include signing an affidavit and providing testimony at grand jury and at trial.
If you receive a subpoena, you must appear in court as specified by that subpoena.
A victim is under no obligation to speak about the facts of the case with anyone. If someone
contacts you concerning the case, make sure that you ask that person to identify himself or herself.
When you answer a question, you must tell the truth.
If others advise you not to appear in court, or if you are threatened or harassed, immediately
contact the assistant district attorney assigned to the case or the Witness Aid Services Unit at 212-335-904
Cracking Down On Serial Abusers
Manhattan DA Cy Vance's Proposal To Make Serial Domestic Abuse A Felony Must Become Law
DA Cy Vance's Case Against Suspect In 1998 Rape Shows Need For DNA Samples From All Criminals (editorial)
District Attorney Vance Announces Sentencing Of Rajeev Kumar In 2000 Rape Case
District Attorney Vance Announces Indictment In 2000 Rape Case
DA Vance: 26 Charged For Possession Of Graphic Images And Videos Of Child Sexual Assault
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Take Action
HOTLINES
Hate Crimes
212-335-3100
Sex Crimes
212-335-9373
Public Integrity
212-335-8987
Special Prosecution
212-335-8900
Immigrant Affairs
212-335-3600
Conviction Integrity
212-335-4016
Elder Abuse
212-335-8920
Family Violence
212-335-4308
The New York County District Attorney's Office is here to prosecute sexual offenders. |
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Heather37
One night this guy was so drunk he grabbed my ass in a Manhattan hotel bar and solicited me for sex. I called hotel security and he was kicked out. Police made a report. The hotel said he's a regular, picked up women every week, and rented their expensive rooms. A slime guy.pandemy |
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Patient Power Tamara Perkins, Andrew Schorr Patient Power where PROSTITUTION meets HEALTHCARE Internet
by User711033
Patient Power has a staff of prostitutes with a history of fraud and theft. Patient power founder Andrew Schorr in support of prostitution by employing prostitute and stripper Tamara Perkins. Tamara Perkins has a history of prostitution, fraud and theft. She is currently the producer for patientpower.info. This brings into question the credibility of information that patientpower.info provides.
A man as intelligent as Andrew Schorr would only choose someone with a history of fraud and theft if he needed that person to commit fraud! Any company that knowlingly employs employees in key positions who have a history of prostitution, fraud and theft has bad intentions and anyone doing business with this company should be advised of the history of employing staff with a a history of fraud and theft. High risk. Be advised. Do not rely on company for credible information. |
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| Patrick is a womanizer. He got into my pants but after I found out he was married, no more for him. He tried to buy me gifts and see me but I told him to go back to his bar and hotel pick-up lines. Married Jerk. |
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I met Patrick B. Hannon in a midtown Manhattan bar and hotel Gramercy. Patrick B. Hannon was a smooth talker and bought me many drinks. Patrick B. Hannon got me drunk and took me up to his hotel room and screwed me the first night. Patrick B. Hannon has been my boyfriend for seven months. I recently found out about his wife that lives with him in Long Island, NY. I found out about Patrick B. Hannon's several other mistresses and Russian prostitutes. Patrick B. Hannon use to like to watch porno movies in our room as we had sex. Patrick B. Hannon brought his own porno movies too. Patrick B. Hannon showed me the videos of himself screwing Russian prostitutes. I was shocked but didn't say too much. Two favorite Russian Prostitutes named Irina and Anya were his specials since he laughed that he could pay them to do anything for money. Patrick B. Hannon was extremely proud of screwing these Russian prostitutes in the ass and making them scream and beg him for more money during sex. All of this is on Patrick B. Hannon's videos. Patrick B. Hannon told me that all of his mistresses and Russian prostitutes were in love with him. Patrick B. Hannon told me that most of his mistresses and Russian prostitutes got pregnant from him and many had his babies but laughed that when a mistress or prostitutes pussy gets pregnant, Patrick B. Hannon dumps them. Now I just told Patrick B. Hannon that I'm pregnant and he said he could care less. Patrick B. Hannon told me to get an abortion or have the kid but he's only interested in screwing me.
One of Patrick B. Hannons's favorite games is to go to facial salons and get a facial and pay the women for blow-jobs and sex intercourse in his private room. The Russian facialists Irina and Anya video taped Patrick B. Hannon screwing them and sold him the tapes. Patrick B. Hannon told me that the Russian women Irina and Anya were both in love with him and had each one been pregnant three times with his babies. Patrick B. Hannon is still married to his wife and lives with her on Long Island, New York.
Patrick B. Hannon told me he gave one of his Russian prostitutes named Irina over $250, 000 to help start her own facial salon and massage house on Madison Avenue where she could sex service her clients in her own business. Patrick B. Hannon told me that Prostitute Irina would do his facial in her lingerie as he sucked her tits in his mouth and fingered her pussy. Patrick B. Hannon told me that Irina would give him sex discounts and often gave him free sex since he gave her so much money. Prostitute Irina was his favorite and Patrick B. Hannon told me that Prostitute Irina would do any sex trick Patrick B. Hannon requested. I just listened as Patrick B. Hannon laughed that he owned most of his mistresses and prostitutes bodies to screw, touch, and lick whenever he wanted. Russian prostitutes Anya and Irina were both married to old men husbands for their money. Many of Patrick B. Hannon's mistresses were married and loved the sex and money Patrick B. Hannon would spend on them.
Patrick B. Hannon use to love to screw me in his wife's bed when she was at work and also at his son's apartment while he was at work. The babysitter would be in the other room with the son's kids and he would want me to scream while we're having sex in the bedroom. Patrick B. Hannon told me even his Russian prostitutes Irina and Anya came over to his son's apartment to be screwed and paid for sex.
Patrick B. Hannon may be a lady's man to all of his mistresses and Russian prostitutes Irina and Anya but he's a sick man that could care less about women's feelings. The only ones profiting are the Russian prostitutes Irina and Anya that get paid for their asses, tits, and pussies. They can keep Patrick B. Hannon. I'm having Patrick B. Hannon's baby but will never share the child with him. I might come by and show Patrick B. Hannon's wife her husband's new baby. No other mistress was brave enough against Patrick B. Hannon to show their baby or tell the wife of their abortions from her husband. Russian favorites prostitutes Anya and Irina should show Patrick B. Hannon the sex video tapes of her husband screwing them in their pussy and ass while throwing family money all over their naked bodies. |
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